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Abstract 
One of the main characteristics of the technological capabilities of countries has always been 
their uneven distribution across the countries. This paper explores the dynamic of technological 
capabilities for a sample of 42 countries over the period 1995-2007 introducing some 
methodological novelties. The results suggest that a process of convergence of technological 
capabilities has occurred to some extent. However, this has not been complete as some countries 
are still unable to reach a balanced growth in the different components of technological 
capabilities. We conclude by arguing that the production of technology can no longer be 
considered a privilege of a few advanced countries. This is going to bear consequences in the 
global arena in terms of trade, international division of labour and technological specialization. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the main characteristics of the technological capabilities of countries has always been 
their uneven distribution. In fact, a few countries (namely, the United States, Europe and Japan) 
have accounted for the world lion’s share of technological capabilities. In the last two decades, 
two issues have persistently interested the community of scholars studying the technological 
capabilities of countries: i. how to provide an overall measure of technological capabilities at the 
national level (i.e. a number), aggregating different dimensions (variables) of the innovation 
activity (Grupp & Schubert, 2010; OECD, 2007); ii. the global dynamic of technology, and in 
particular whether a process of global convergence is occurring, or, instead, a club of a few 
advanced countries is still responsible for the major production of technology and innovation 
(Archibugi & Iammarino, 2002; Porter et al., 2009; Tassey, 2008). 
The long standing attractiveness of these two topics relies on the belief that technology is 
a conditio sine qua non for long-term growth and catching-up. The other fundamental premise is 
that the process of technology adoption and diffusion does not occur in a spontaneous way as the 
neoclassical theory claimed, but requires an explicit and costly effort. This paper aims to explore 
the dynamic of technological capabilities (convergence versus divergence, catching-up versus 
falling behind) for a sample of 42 countries over the period 1995-2007. To accomplish this task 
we introduce some methodological novelties, which allow us to identify and qualify the main 
trends that underpinned this process. 
The use of composite indicators to summarize in a synthetic way the overall 
technological capabilities of a nation has come to remarkable prominence over the last decade. 
This approach has been largely adopted by several scholars, international organizations and 
policy makers (OECD, 2007).
1
 The development of a methodology to measure technological 
capabilities at the national level is a demanding task for two main reasons. First, innovation is 
multidimensional in nature, as it encompasses different activities ranging from basic research to 
design and engineering (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986). Second, these measures are often indirect 
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since the phenomenon they are trying to capture is “intangible and not directly observable” 
(Grupp & Schubert, 2010, p. 68). Moreover, the various sources of innovation are 
complementary rather than interchangeable, as often implicitly assumed behind the structure of 
the composite indicators. Infrastructures devoid of a sufficiently qualified labour force will be 
useless and vice versa (Abramovitz, 1989; Maddison, 1991). Additionally, qualified human 
resources are key in the process of adoption and adaptation of technology developed abroad 
(Bell & Pavitt, 1997; World Bank, 1998). Finally, along with the revolution of the Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICTs), tapping global knowledge has become an imperative 
(Rifkin, 2000; World Bank, 1998).  
Composite indicators (simple or weighted averaging) have been used to express in a 
single aggregate measure the technological capabilities of countries (Archibugi & Coco, 2004). 
More recently Cherchye et al. (2007) introduced a “benefit of the doubt” indicator based on Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques. The rational for the introduction of this last index is 
that the weights are chosen endogenously by the linear program associated to the DEA 
technique. Composite indicators and DEA indicators are two of the three main methodologies 
surveyed by Grupp and Schubert (2010) in a recent study (the other being based on principal 
components and here excluded from the discussion for reasons of space). The two 
methodologies give rise to different results and different ranking of countries, raising the 
question of which one of the two indicators should be used in practice. 
Our first contribution, methodological in nature, is to provide a link between these two 
methodologies. We exploit duality theory (see Fare and Primont, 1995) to establish a link 
between the weighted average composite indicator and the DEA indicator. In this way we are 
able to give an explanation of the observed differential between the composite indicator and the 
DEA indicator. Far from being a failure of the methodology, this difference is able to highlight 
the different trajectories of technological capabilities growth for the different countries. This 
new methodological interpretation gives us the opportunity to investigate in some detail the 
 5 
different aspects of the process of globalization of technology over the last 15 years. Our 
empirical results suggest that a process of convergence of technological capabilities has occurred 
to some extent. However, this has not been complete as some countries are still unable to reach a 
balanced growth in the different components of technological capabilities. We conclude by 
arguing that the production of technology and innovation can no longer be considered a privilege 
of a few countries belonging to the Triad. This is going to bear, in the opinion of the authors, 
relevant consequences in the global arena. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the basic conceptual background of the 
analysis. In section 3 we explain the rationale behind the selection of variables and describe the 
dataset. Section 4 is devoted to the presentation of the methodology. Section 5 shows the results 
of the analysis, while Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. BACKGROUND: TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES AND CATCHING-UP 
The fundamental importance of technological innovation as a driver for long-run growth has 
been made clear by a large body of studies (for a review see Verspagen, 2005). A related stream 
of empirical papers has shown that differences in technology are a fundamental source of 
different growth rates across countries (Castellacci, 2008; Fagerberg, 1994; Fagerberg & 
Godinho, 2005; Pianta, 1995). Additionally, Fagerberg and Verspagen (2002) find that the 
importance of technological innovation vis-à-vis the importance of institutions for economic 
growth has increased lately. This is in tune to what argued from an historical perspective by 
Mokyr (2002) who argues that technological innovation is more likely to explain over time 
development differences vis-à-vis institutions which instead are more relevant regarding cross-
section differences. Having saying that, the problem has been shifted to identify how lagging-
behind countries can close the technology gap through catching-up processes. 
 6 
In this respect, technological capabilities have demonstrated to play a crucial role. The 
technological capabilities approach departs from the neoclassical approach in which technology 
is freely available for lagging behind countries. The cornerstone of studies dealing with 
technological capabilities is the assumption that countries differ in their capacity to absorb and 
adapt technology developed abroad. Processes of imitation and adoption are costly, require 
previous knowledge and skills, and imply learning (Abramovitz, 1986; Bell & Pavitt, 1997; 
Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Gerschenkron, 1962; Lall, 1992; Perez & Soete, 1996). In a nutshell, 
imitation is far to be a simple plug-in process, whilst it rather requires a big deliberate effort and 
the presence of endogenous capabilities. Differences in technological capabilities lie at the heart 
of the explanation of why countries have a diverse ability to catch up advanced countries by 
imitating and adopting foreign advanced technology (Abramovitz, 1986; Archibugi & 
Pietrobelli, 2003; Castellacci, 2008; Fagerberg et al., 2007; Figueiredoa, 2008; Iammarino et al., 
2008; Patel & Pavitt, 1994). 
One of the first attempts to address technological capabilities at the country level has been 
made by Lall (1992). Lall’s measures of national technological capabilities include several 
variables grouped in three main dimensions including “structure and performance” (i.e. growth, 
export GDP and so on), “education” and “science and technology”. Archibugi and Coco (2004) 
developed an index of technological capabilities for a large number of both developed and 
developing countries relative to two periods of time (1990 and 2000). Their index is divided into 
three main dimensions, the “creation of technology”, the “technological infrastructures” and the 
“development of human skills”. By comparing the two years they point out the important growth 
of the Asian tigers, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and also the remarkable 
improvement of China and India but limited to the technological infrastructures. The Georgia 
Tech Technology Policy and Assessment Center has developed the High-Tech Indicators not just 
to measure the current technological capabilities, but to forecast how the present capabilities can 
lead to secure quotas of high-tech exports (Roessner et al. 1996). This indicator is composed of 
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four input indicators which reflect national propensity for future technology-based 
competitiveness, and three output indicators. These indicators are built through a combination of 
an expert opinion survey and hard data. Finally, recent studies have showed that countries tend 
to group in homogeneous groups – clubs - according to their characteristics of technological 
capabilities and growth trajectories (Castellacci & Archibugi, 2008; Castellacci 2008). 
 
3. THE GLOBAL CAPABILITIES INDEX (GLOCAP) 
The last 15 years have seen at least two main structural phenomena in the international 
arena: first, the emerging of a group of Asian economies in terms of growth and technological 
change; second, the explosion and diffusion of ICT technology at mass level. Both these effects 
cannot be captured using cross-sectional analysis (that is static in nature). Also, previous 
exercises in building composite indicators of technological capabilities (Archibugi & Coco, 
2004) have to be updated in order to account for the importance of the new technologies. We 
address these issues by using a panel data that covers, basically, the period of time in which both 
the previous phenomena occurred. We follow (Archibugi & Coco, 2004) in grouping our 
variables into three main categories or pillars: Business Innovation, Knowledge&Skills, 
Infrastructures. This study deviates from (Archibugi & Coco, 2004) introducing the number of 
PC and internet users explicitly in the analysis as well as in dividing R&D expenditures in 
business R&D and public R&D in order to point out their relative contribution. Additionally, it 
uses a balanced panel dataset which allows a more robust dynamic analysis. In Table 1 the nine 
variables feeding into the Global Capabilities Index (GloCap) and the data sources are presented 
grouped in three pillars. In the following we discuss them in detail. 
  
--- TABLE 1 --- 
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Business innovation 
The importance attached to the business sector in carrying out innovation is 
straightforward. To capture the innovative performance of firms both patents and Business R&D 
(BERD) are used. Patents have been largely used for accounting commercial purpose generated 
technological innovation (Griliches, 1990). At such, they can be considered a “tolerable 
assumption” (Schmookler, 1962) of the innovative activities of firms. We use the “triadic 
patents” which correspond to patents filed at the European Patent Office (EPO), the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the Japan Patent Office (JPO), for the same 
invention, by the same applicant or inventor (OECD, 2008; , 2004). The advantage of using this 
particular family of patent is twofold. First, they are a reliable tool for cross-country comparison, 
given that they include the three more important and natural patent office in the world. Second, 
the underlying innovation related to a patent filed in the three most important offices across the 
world is more likely to be valuable (in commercial terms, loosely defined) with respect to an 
innovation protected only in one single office.  
R&D expenditures have also been largely considered as a measure of input of the 
innovative effort of the firms (OECD, 2002). It represents the natural candidate as a 
complementary measure with respect to patents for at least two reasons. First, patent intensity 
can largely differ across industrial sectors (Cohen et al., 2000). Consequently, cross-countries 
differences in terms of patent intensity can reflect a different industrial structure. Second, patents 
by definition are not capable to capture service innovation, while in advanced countries services 
have been dramatically growing in importance in terms of innovation investment and knowledge 
creation and exploitation. The growing of R&D expenses in the service sector (Miles, 2005; 
OECD, 2005) calls for the use of this indicator as a reliable proxy to capture the innovation 
effort in this sector. 
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Knowledge&skills 
Human resources, in terms of education, knowledge and skills are considered a 
fundamental ingredient within the wide concept of absorptive capacity (OECD 2003). The 
literature dealing with growth has largely recognized the importance of these factors by 
introducing them in its models. Howitt (2000) shows that cross-country differences in the returns 
to investments to human capital are key to explain the dynamic of absorptive capacity. Azariadis 
and Drazen (1990) argue that difference in growth rates can be explained by the presence of 
threshold externalities in the accumulation of human and physical capital. In brief, the quality of 
the human resources is key not only to generate knowledge but also, and crucially for emerging 
economies, for enabling imitation and adoption of technology developed elsewhere (World 
Bank, 1998). 
Three variables are used for this pillar: researchers, scientific articles and Public R&D.
2
 
The variable “total researchers in R&D” is expected to reflect the magnitude of human resources 
with high-skills involved in formal scientific-based and technological-based activities, both in 
the public and in the private sector. The variable “scientific and technical articles” represents the 
magnitude of the generation of codified knowledge. Specifically, it reflects the knowledge 
generated in the universities and public-funded research centres. However, it also reflects 
knowledge generated in the private sector which over the last years have been publishing an 
increasing share of scientific and technical articles. Finally, Public R&D gives account of the 
resources devoted to formal research activities by the public sector, including both governmental 
institutions and higher education institutions. 
 
 Infrastructures 
The importance attached to capital and technological infrastructures has also been recognised 
to be a fundamental conditio for countries to develop (World Bank, 1998). This has increasingly 
become a necessary requirement with the revolution of the new information and communication 
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technologies (ICTs) which has profoundly changed the way people do things, leading to 
fundamental changing in the organizational structure of the firm, their business models, the 
channels for the sharing and diffusion of knowledge across countries (Castells, 1996). Within 
this environment, being connected has become a necessary condition for countries to access 
knowledge created and circulated across the globe (Rifkin, 2000). Personal computers, fixed-line 
and mobile phones and the number internet users should capture all together the quality of the 
network and infrastructures of a country to tap global knowledge.
3
 Additionally, we added fixed 
capital aiming at capturing the physical infrastructure which can be key especially at the 
beginning of catching-up processes (Pianta, 1995).  
 
 
4. METHODOLOGY: COMPOSITE INDICATORS AND DATA ENVELOPMENT 
ANALYSIS 
According to Cherchye et al. (2005), there are at least three main problems which need to be 
addressed when constructing composite indicators: i. the choice of the single “ingredients”; ii. 
the pre-treatment of the data (i.e. the process of normalization); iii. how the single indicators will 
merge into a single metric (that is the choice of the appropriate weights scheme). The first point 
has been addressed in section 3. To address the other points we need to introduce some formal 
notation. At every time Tt ,...,1= , for every country Kk ,...,1= , each variable Mm ,...,1=  is 
observed. We collect all this information into a set of T matrices (one for each time period): 
[ ]tkmt Y=Y  
where tkmY  is the value of variable m for country k at time t. This means that along row k we 
observe all the values assumed by the variables for country k at time t. Pre-treatment of data has 
basically been done using one of the following procedures (small y is the standardized variable) 
(Nardo et al., 2005): 
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1. Range Standardization: 
minmax
min
mm
m
t
kmt
km
YY
YY
y
−
−
=  where minmY  is the minimum value variable m 
assumes in the dataset and maxmY  is the maximum value variable m assumes in the dataset; 
2. Z-Standardized: 
( )m
mean
m
t
kmt
km
Ystd
YY
y
−
= , where meanmY  is the mean value of variable m in the 
dataset; 
3. Mean adjusted: 
mean
m
t
kmt
km
Y
Y
y = ; 
4. Maximum adjusted: 
max
m
t
kmt
km
Y
Y
y = ; 
Now, it is possible to show (see Lovell and Pastor, 1995) that DEA is not invariant to 
transformation 1) and 2), but it is invariant to transformations 3) and 4) (rescaling of the original 
values). This means that the DEA indicator (“benefit of the doubt” indicator) gives the same 
value if applied to the original variables or to 3) and 4), but it gives a different value if applied to 
1) and 2). In our opinion, this is a sufficient reason to reject 1) and 2) from our standardization 
exercise. Transformations 3) and 4) both return dimensionless variables. We chose 
transformation 4) on the basis of the fact that the variables also range between zero and one and 
this facilitates the localization of the best performers along each variable as well giving a good 
intuitive proxy of the “level” of each country with respect to the best performer. 
The construction of a composite indicator requires the specification of a vector of weights 
[ ]Mpp ,...,1=p  to be used in the aggregation (the weights are assumed to be positive and sum up 
to one 1=∑m mp ). The composite indicator will be: 
∑
=
=
M
m
t
kmm
t
k ypC
1
 
A quite controversial issue arises from the choice of the effective weights to be used in such a 
formula (Grupp & Mogee, 2004; Grupp & Schubert, 2010). Before going trough the explanation 
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of the actual weights we used in practice, let us establish some formal relationship between such 
and index and the DEA index. The result will be presented for any set of weights chosen, so that 
it will be perfectly general (i.e., it holds for any possible vector of positive weights that sum up 
to one). In the appendix we also introduce a generalization of the method here presented where 
the composite indicator assume a CES functional form (incorporating the linear as special case). 
 We define the Technological Capabilities Set (S) as the piecewise linear envelope of the 
observed dataset: 
{ }0,: ≥≤= zzYyyS  
Associated to this set, we define the Technological Capabilities Frontier (TCF) as the set of 
Koopmans efficient points: 





 ∉<<∀= S
y
yTCF
θ
θ ,10:  
 
--- FIGURE 1 --- 
 
A graphical representation can improve the understanding of these notions. In Figure 1 a 
simple case is considered where 5 countries (Sweden, Usa, Netherlands, Argentina and Brazil) 
are evaluated with respect to two dimensions (Articles and Patents). The set of feasible values 
for the considered variables (S) will be all the area limited by the axis and the bold black line. 
This means that a point outside this area is infeasible (given this set of observations). From the 
figure it is possible to note that while USA, Sweden and Netherlands lie along the bold black 
line (the TCF), Argentina and Brazil lie in the interior of the set S. In fact the first 3 countries 
define the TCF. As it is easy to check, for these countries it is not possible to expand 
proportionally all the variables and still stay in the feasible set S. On the contrary Argentina and 
Brazil can expand proportionally their variables. For example Argentina can move from its place 
to point a onto the TCF. This means that Argentina shows a deviation from the efficient frontier 
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TCF. DEA is precisely used to identify the magnitude of this deviation and to build the linear 
envelope that constitutes the frontier (the bold line). 
Now, using a composite indicator gives us some additional information. In the two 
dimensional example of figure 1, the weights can be represented as a straight line. The further 
this line lies on the right the higher the value of the associated composite indicator. In the 
example, Sweden shows the maximum value of the composite indicator for the given weights. It 
is important to note that while the DEA indicator gives the same value for USA and Sweden, the 
composite indicator gives different values. In fact DEA signals deviation from Koopman 
efficiency that is a very weak and general notion of efficiency. USA is Koopmans efficient (it 
has less article but more patents than Sweden), but it is not the country that maximizes the value 
of the composite indicator for the given exogenous weights. This difference in the composite 
indicator is given by the distance between the two straight lines passing trough US and Sweden. 
And this difference is totally due to a Compositional effect, namely the different proportion in 
which articles and patents are in Sweden and USA. From the figure it is easy to check that for 
Argentina the case is different. In fact, the difference in the composite indicator (distance 
between the straight dashed lines) is partly due to a pure deviation from the TCF and partly to a 
Compositional effect, i.e. a deviation from the optimal proportion of articles and patents 
represented by Sweden. 
The graphical representation suggests that there are two very different effects operating: 
one is due to a proportional deviation from the TCF and the other one due to a deviation from 
the optimizing composition of the variables along the TCF. These two effects can be measured 
and related to each other by the following procedure. The deviation from the TCF can be 
measured solving the following linear programming problem for each observation k at each 
period of time t: 
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This linear programming problem is searching for the maximum proportional expansion 
of the observed variables such to place observation k onto the TCF. Therefore, for example, this 
index will return a value of one for USA in the previous example, but a value that is less than 
one for Argentina and Brazil. One of the attractive features of the DEA index is that it is 
bounded in the unit interval 10 << tkDEA , assumes a value equal to one when the country is 
onto the TCF and a value of zero if all the variables observed for the given country are zero. 
These are quite useful properties. One of the shortcomings of using such an index is that it gives 
the same value to observations that are on the TCF. This is where the composite indicator steps 
in a useful way. Introducing a set of weights [ ]Mpp ,...,1=p  allows demarcating the performance 
of countries on the TCF. It is possible to define a linear program that search for the maximum 
value achievable with the given exogenous weights in the set S: 
Kjz
Kkyzyts
ypC
j
K
j
t
jmj
t
m
M
m
mm
yz
t
,,1,0
,,1,..
max
1
1
,
max
K
K
=∀≥
=∀≤
=
∑
∑
=
=
 
Now, for each given country it is possible to define a composite index of technological 
capabilities as the ratio between the observed index and the maximum achievable index: 
t
t
kt
k
C
C
CE
max
=  
This composite indicator will be bounded between zero and one allowing for an easy 
interpretation. Moreover we are now in a position to establish a link between the composite 
indicator and the DEA indicator. From duality theory (see, for example, Fare & Primont, 1995) 
we know that 
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t
k
t
k DEACE ≤  
This result is quite remarkable and has been greatly underestimated in the literature. One 
of the consequences of this result is that any composite indicator (for any choice of weights) 
cannot reach its maximum unless the DEA indicator is equal to one. In other words, DEA 
catching-up is a prerequisite for any other type of convergence; or, catching-up for any type of 
composite indicator (for any choice of weights) is observable only if the DEA indicator shows 
catching-up. 
Besides that, the gap between the two indicators has a quite simple interpretation, 
measuring the deviation between the observed composition of the variables and the ideal 
composition. Following figure 1, Argentina can first expand proportionally its variables to point 
a to reach the TCF. This will also proportionally increase the value of its composite indicator; 
but point a does not represent the best. In fact, Argentina can change the composition of its 
variables from a more patent intensive to a more article intensive pattern, moving along the TCF 
and reaching the maximum value represented by Sweden. Thus the deviation between the DEA 
indicator and the composite indicator is a signal of how much the composition of the variables is 
close to the best composition. Formally it is possible to define such a deviation in a residual way 
as: 
t
k
t
kt
k
DEA
CE
AE =  
This index is bounded between zero and one, with one signalling optimal composition. 
Since all this analysis has been put forward keeping the weights fixed, we also get a very 
accurate understanding of the role of the weights in defining the composite indicator: the weights 
actually select the ideal composition along the TCF. Associated to each vector of weights, we 
have a different optimal composition along the TCF. This is represented by a different slope of 
the dashed lines in the two variables example. 
 16 
Now, we are prepared to see what happen between two time periods. From t to t+1 the 
change in the composite indicator can be decomposed as: 
1111 ++++ ∆⋅∆⋅∆=∆ ttk
t
k
t
k FAEDEAC  
where 
t
k
t
kt
k
DEA
DEA
DEA
1
1
+
+ =∆  is the change in the DEA index, 
t
t
AE
AE
AE 1+=∆  is the change in the 
Compositional index, 
t
t
t
C
C
F
max
1
max1
+
+ =∆  is the change in the maximal achievable value of the 
composite indicator and represents a measure of how much the TCF shifted between the two 
time periods (TCF shift trend). These three indexes signal very different underlying phenomena. 
DEA index change takes a value greater (smaller) than one if the country is closer (farther) to the 
TCF frontier at time t+1 with respect to time t (the country is catching-up the TCF, or vice 
versa). The Compositional index change takes a value greater (smaller) than one if the 
composition of the variables for the country is closer (farther) from the optimal composition. 
The TCF shift trend takes a value larger (smaller) than one if the best country has improved 
(deteriorated) the values of its variables. All these indexes take a value of one if no change is 
observed. 
It is worth reminding that all these indexes are relative indexes. A country can fall behind 
while just keeping a constant value of its variables. This is due to the fact that the TCF is moving 
over time and countries need to improve just to avoid a worsening. Also, a country showing a 
constant value of the DEA index and of the Compositional index, still will have a positive growth 
in the observed variables due to the TC component. This means that the TC component measures 
the global trend in the growth of variables. 
As said before, the TC components will signal if there was a global trend in the variables, 
i.e. if at the end of the period countries are globally more productive in the production of 
innovation than they were at the beginning. Thus the catching-up issue will regard basically the 
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other two components. Table 2 summarizes the four typologies of catching-up processes that we 
are able to single out. 
 
TABLE 2 
 
Since the indexes are calculated for every country, we are able to disentangle the trajectory of 
every single country. To have an overall measure of the global dynamics we test the 
convergence hypothesis on the GloCap index, the DEA index and the Compositional index. 
 
 
5. THE GLOBAL DYNAMIC OF TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES 
 
The choice of the weighing scheme 
Due to the duality result established in the previous section, we are now in a position to 
make a reasonable choice for the weights to use for the GloCap. Since the DEA index is always 
larger than the composite indicator index, choosing the set of weights implies identifying a target 
country on the TCF. In other words, we are seeking a reference country among those which present 
a value for the DEA index equal to 1 (this means they are on the TCF). To give some highlights on 
this issue, let us have a look to the countries that compose the TCF in 1995 (DEA index equals 1). 
 
TABLE 3 
 
By looking at the pillar composition in Table three, one easily checks that Sweden is the 
most “equilibrated” country in terms of pillar composition. The superior performance of Israel with 
respect to Sweden in Pillar two (due to a value for public R&D that is out of the norm), is traded off 
by a sharp decrease in Pillar one, and in Pillar three to a lesser extent. The main point here is that 
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Sweden will be dominating the other countries in terms of the composite indicator index for a large 
set of different weights. In other terms, in order to choose Israel as the target country onto the TCF 
frontier, one has to pick up very extreme values of the weights to give a premium to the Pillar two. 
This is, of course, unreasonable, since choosing extreme values for the weights means leaning 
towards a non equilibrated composition of the pillars. This would be in contrast with the 
predominating idea, among innovation scholars, that innovation process requires the presence of 
complementary technological capabilities (pillar equilibration).
4
 As a result from a sensitive 
analysis, we found that Sweden gets the highest score of the GloCap for several alternative choices 
of the weights. Based on this evidence, we choose to set the following set of weights: 0.three for the 
Pillar one, 0.three for the Pillar two, 0.4 for the Pillar three. Pillars are unweighted averages and this 
implies that we are implicitly evaluating market oriented innovation (pillar one) more than the other 
variables. 
 
The results of the empirical analysis 
In this section the results of the empirical analysis are presented. In Figure 2 we plot the 
GloCap Index change over the 13 years period and the GloCap Index95. An overall process of 
convergence in technological capabilities across the considered countries arises to some extent. A 
good deal of the countries which were lagging behind at the beginning of the period exhibit faster 
rates of growth and vice versa. However, one does not observe convergence for all the countries. 
The presence of a moderate convergence process is confirmed by the correlation rate between the 
ranking of the GloCap Index change and the ranking of the GloCap Index95 which is equal to -0.52 
(Table 1A in the Appendix). The second point which is worth-stressing is the large variability of 
rates of growth across lagging behind countries. Countries like Lithuania, China, Poland and Brazil 
which show similar scores relative to GloCap Index95 exhibit very different rates of growth.   
 
--- FIGURE 2 --- 
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As illustrated in Section 4,  the GloCap Index can be decomposed in two main components, the 
DEA index change and the Compositional index. As we already explained, the DEA Index change 
provides an “objective” measure of the expansion of a country’s technological capabilities. The 
Compositional index is instead a measure of the “correctness” of the balance between the three 
pillars composing the GloCap. In Figure 3 we report the same exercise provided in Figure 2 but 
with regards to the two main component of the GloCap Index change, the DEA index and the 
Compositional index. The differences between the two graphs are striking. As far as the DEA index 
is concerned, a clear and linear process of convergence emerges as confirmed by the correlation rate 
between the ranking of the DEA index change and the ranking of the DEA index95 which is equal to 
-0.74 (Table 1A in the Appendix). The only countries which show a DEA index change lower than 
one are the Russian Federation, Australia and the United States, while all the others are above one. 
This suggests that nearly all the considered countries have been improving their level of 
technological capabilities, that is they have been catching-up the TCF. Crucially, the rate of growth 
of the DEA indicator is directly proportional do the distance to the TFC at the beginning of the 
considered period. That is, the larger the technological gap of a country, the faster the catching-up 
processes has occurred. It is also worth stressing that among the nations experiencing faster rates of 
growth there are the BRICS countries, namely China, India, Brazil and South Africa (with the 
exception of the Russian Federation) together with two other large emerging economy like Turkey 
and Mexico.   
 
--- FIGURE 3 --- 
 
If we look at the second graph reporting the dynamic of the Compositional index, a complete 
different picture arises. Specifically, across the lagging behind countries there is evidence of a 
process of convergence for some of them, while conversely, other laggard countries exhibit a clear 
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process of divergence. The lack of a significant process of convergence as a whole is confirmed by 
the correlation rate between the ranking of the Compositional index change and the ranking of the 
Compositional index95 which is equal to -0.13 (Table 1A in the Appendix). In this case, nearly half 
of the considered countries lie above the value of one which reflects a relative worsening of the 
balance of the three pillars of the GloCap. It is also clear that the cross-country variability is 
remarkably high concerning the laggard countries, while it tends to reduce progressively moving 
towards more advances nations. As far as the BRICS countries are concerned, in this case only 
China and the Russian Federation are above one (together with Mexico and Turkey), while India, 
Brazil and South Africa are far below one.   
 
In Figure 4 the DEA index change is plotted against the Compositional index change.
5
 In this 
way we are able to distinguish four groups of countries according to the characteristics of their 
catching-up processes over the considered period:  
• The unbalanced catch-up group: these countries show a remarkable growth in terms of DEA 
index change over the considered period. However, they did not manage to improve the 
composition of their technological capabilities, as they score below one in terms of 
Compositional index change thus highlighting a deterioration of their balance of 
technological capabilities among the three GloCap pillars. This group includes the largest 
part of developing and emerging countries, namely three BRICS countries (Brazil, India and 
South Africa) and nearly all of the EU New Member States, together with Argentina;  
• The balanced catch-up group: in this group countries show a good performance both in 
terms of  DEA index change as well as relative to the Compositional index change. In other 
terms, they have managed to narrow the gap with the TCF and at the same time they have 
improved the allocation of their technological capabilities. Only five countries are included 
in this group: three large emerging economies, such as China, Mexico and Turkey, and the 
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two Baltic countries included in the sample which have also recently joined the EU, Estonia 
and Lithuania; 
• The re-allocating group: countries belonging to this group show a low performance in terms 
of DEA index change. However, they have succeeded in re-allocating their technological 
capabilities toward a more efficient composition. This group includes a good deal of 
countries which are not the leader in technological capabilities but can no longer be 
considered emerging countries, such as some European countries, advanced Asian nations 
like Singapore and Korea Republic, and Australia and New Zealand;  
• The leader group: finally, countries included in these groups are the leaders whose 
technological leadership appears to have been increasingly eroded by the other countries. 
This group includes the most technological advanced countries in the world. 
 
--- FIGURE 4 --- 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This article’s aim was to explore the dynamic of technological capabilities for a large set of 
countries using a novel methodological approach. In this section we point out the contribution in 
terms of methodology, we then discuss the main results and finally consider some consequences 
which have a bearing in terms of policy.  
From a methodological perspective, the exploitation of duality theory gave us the opportunity to 
go inside the black box of the choice of weights. We showed that the choice of weights in the 
composite indicator formula corresponds to the choice of a compositional target onto the 
technological capabilities frontier . This basically means that the choice of weights is equivalent to 
the choice of the target country among the countries having a DEA score equal to one. This greatly 
reduces the complexities associated to the choice of weights, since the researcher can now look to 
the variables associated only to a small number of countries (eight in our sample). We also showed 
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that among the countries with a full DEA score, only Sweden shows a reasonable equilibrated value 
across the three pillars, thus justifying the choice of weights used in the analysis. Thanks to the 
duality result discussed in this paper, the divergence between DEA (“benefit of the doubt”) and any 
composite indicator that uses positive weights found a sharp - and extremely useful in economic 
terms - interpretation as compositional effect. This compositional effect signals a deviation from the 
“optimal” equilibrated composition among pillars and to our knowledge has been introduced in this 
study for the first time. On overall, our approach suggests that composite indicators and DEA 
indexes can be seen (and used) as complementary rather than substitute methodologies. 
The analysis shows that a process of convergence in technological capabilities has occurred to 
some extent for the 42 considered countries over the period 1995-2007 (Figure 2). By looking at the 
first graph of the Figure 3 one can observe a clear pattern of convergence in terms of DEA Index. 
More specifically, the speed of the catching-up processes is directly proportional to the size of the 
gap with the TCF at the beginning of the period. Countries which were far away from the TCS 
exhibit faster rates of growth in technological capabilities. In this sense, the presence of a large gap 
seems to represent a good opportunity to spur catching-up processes for lagging behind nations. 
Two large blocks of countries have been considerably improving their performance: the BRICS 
countries (with the exception of the Russian Federation), and the EU New Member States.  In a 
nutshell, there is no doubt that the TCF is these days more crowded with respect to the 1995.  
We were also able to further qualify this process by looking at the dynamic of the balance of the 
different components of the GloCap. By looking at the second graph of the Figure 3, one can also 
observe that no convergence occurred in terms of the Compositional Index. While countries tend to 
close their technological gap over time, they seem to do that in very different ways. We then 
divided countries in two main groups (Figure 4) according to the nature (balanced/unbalanced) of 
their catch-up process. One overall, it arises that among the countries narrowing their technological 
gap the unbalanced catching-up process is predominant. That is, a great deal of emerging countries 
have been improving their technological capabilities over this period but they also ended up with a 
 23 
worsening relative to their balance among the three pillars. In particular, three large emerging 
economies such as China, Mexico and Turkey, along with two Baltic Republic, Estonia and 
Lithuania, exhibit a balanced catch-up process. On the other side, three BRICS countries, namely 
Brazil, South Africa and India, together with another large economy like Argentina and several of 
the New EU Member States show an unbalanced process of catch-up. As already stressed, 
innovation capabilities of the private sector, human resources and technological infrastructures are 
growth ingredients profoundly complementary in nature. This provides an important clue about the 
different typologies of catching-up processes we have indentified here.  
We conclude arguing that the dynamic of technological capabilities across the countries over the 
last decades lends some support towards the end of the hegemony of the Triad – Unites States, 
Europe and Japan. Among the countries which are catching-up, one has to keep in mind that some 
of them are very large economies and therefore their relative improvement bears remarkable 
consequences in absolute terms across the global arena. It is just worth mentioning that Brazil, 
China, India, Mexico and Turkey account for the 70 per cent of the labour force of our sample. 
These countries have demonstrated to be increasingly integrated in the international trade and 
included in the global supply chain of the multinational enterprises (UNCTAD, 2005, 2006). There 
are no evident reasons suggesting that in the following years this process should come to an end. In 
the opinion of the authors, this is likely to bear substantial consequences in terms of international 
trade, international division of labour, evolution of technological specialization and structural 
changes. 
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Appendix A: robustness analysis 
All the previous analysis is based on the assumption that the composite indicator has a linear 
structure. This could be considered restrictive. In this appendix we show that all the previous 
analysis can be settled in a very general specification. We start by defining the composite indicator 
C using a CES aggregator function: 
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The CES function incorporates as special cases the Cobb-Douglas function (s=1), the Leontief 
function ( 0→s ) and the linear function ( ∞→s ). This means that the parameter s is a calibration 
parameter to choose the degree of convexity of the function: the more it is convex the less allow for 
substitution. Now for any aggregator function like that we can solve the following non-linear 
problem: 
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and use it to define a composite indicator dual to the DEA index. We did it for the limiting case of 
the Leontief aggregator function. In this case the function becomes: 
{ }tkMtktk yyC ,,min 1 K=  
The Leontief aggregator function gives a very stringent notion of ideal composition, penalizing any 
deviation from the complete balanced composition tkM
t
k
t
k yyy === K21 . The results are not 
significantly different from the ones obtained with the linear aggregator function, but add a lot on 
the side of computation. Results of this analysis are available on request and are omitted for reasons 
of space. 
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Appendix B: tables and figures 
 
Table 1. The three pillars and nine variables feeding into the index, and the relative data sources 
Pillar Variable Data Source 
Triadic patents OECD 
Business 
innovation 
Business R&D (BERD) OECD, 
UNCTAD 
Total researchers in R&D (FTE) OECD 
Scientific and technical articles WDI (World 
Bank) 
Public R&D (PUBRD): Government Intramural Expenditure on 
R&D (GOVERD) + Higher Education Expenditure on R&D 
(HERD) 
OECD, 
UNCTAD 
Labour force with tertiary education (variable omitted due to high 
correlation) 
WDI (World 
Bank) 
Knowledge&skills 
S&T enrolment in tertiary programmes (variable omitted due to high 
correlation) 
UNESCO 
Personnel computers WDI (World 
Bank) 
Fixed-line and mobile telephones WDI (World 
Bank) 
Internet users WDI (World 
Bank) 
Fixed capital WDI (World 
Bank) 
Infrastructures 
Broadband subscribers (variable omitted due to high correlation) WDI (World 
Bank) 
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Figure 1. An example of the Technological Capabilities Set and the TCF 
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Table 2. The four typologies of catching-up processes 
 
  
DEA index > 1 
 
DEA index < 1 
Compositional Index > 1 Balanced catching-up 
 
Composition improving 
 
Compositional Index < 1 Unbalanced catching-up 
 
Falling behind 
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Table 3. The three pillars scores in 1995 relative to countries on the TCF 
Country Pillar 1 Pillar2 Pillar3 
Finland  0.399 0.472 0.258 
France  0.311 0.433 0.209 
Iceland  0.129 0.438 0.196 
Israel  0.307 0.75 0.206 
Japan  0.486 0.451 0.267 
Netherlands  0.323 0.466 0.228 
Norway  0.177 0.447 0.274 
Sweden  0.584 0.547 0.242 
Switzerland  0.626 0.49 0.289 
United States  0.394 0.474 0.257 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Convergence in technological capabilities over the period 1995-2007 (42 countries) 
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Figure 3. Convergence in DEA index and Compositional index over the period 1995-2007, (42 countries) 
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Figure 4. The dynamic of DEA index and compositional index  over the period 1995-2007, (42 countries) 
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                 Note: y-axis crosses at the average value  
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Table A1. Indexes scores and rankings, (42 countries ranked by GloCap Index 2007) 
  Index scores   Rankings 
Country 
GloCap 
Index95 
GloCap 
Index2007 
DEA  
Index
95 
DEA 
Index20
07 
Compositional 
Index95 
Compositional 
Index2007 
 
GloCap 
Index95 
GloCap 
Index2007 
DEA  
Index95 
DEA 
Index20
07 
Compositional 
Index95 
Compositional 
Index2007 
Sweden 0.436 0.750 1.000 1.000 0.969 1.000  2 1 1 1 2 1 
Israel 0.400 0.708 1.000 1.000 0.889 0.944  3 2 1 1 3 2 
Switzerland 0.450 0.701 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.935  1 3 1 1 1 3 
Finland 0.364 0.695 1.000 1.000 0.809 0.927  5 4 1 1 5 4 
Japan 0.388 0.659 1.000 1.000 0.862 0.879  4 5 1 1 4 5 
Denmark 0.302 0.636 0.939 1.000 0.715 0.848  10 6 12 1 11 7 
Singapore 0.204 0.633 0.856 1.000 0.530 0.844  18 7 14 1 22 8 
US 0.363 0.632 1.000 0.967 0.807 0.871  6 8 1 18 7 6 
Norway 0.297 0.614 1.000 1.000 0.660 0.819  12 9 1 1 14 10 
Netherlands 0.328 0.609 1.000 1.000 0.729 0.812  7 10 1 1 9 11 
Germany 0.327 0.605 0.899 1.000 0.808 0.807  8 11 13 1 6 12 
Austria 0.240 0.585 0.805 0.933 0.663 0.836  16 12 17 20 13 9 
Belgium 0.301 0.570 0.842 1.000 0.794 0.760  11 13 16 1 8 13 
France 0.307 0.558 1.000 0.980 0.682 0.759  9 14 1 16 12 14 
Iceland 0.248 0.545 1.000 1.000 0.551 0.727  15 15 1 1 19 16 
Korea, Rep. 0.157 0.529 0.637 0.961 0.548 0.734  22 16 24 19 20 15 
UK 0.259 0.520 0.805 0.979 0.715 0.708  13 17 17 17 10 17 
Canada 0.254 0.519 0.856 1.000 0.659 0.692  14 18 14 1 15 18 
Ireland 0.184 0.484 0.735 1.000 0.556 0.645  20 19 21 1 18 22 
Australia 0.218 0.453 0.963 0.905 0.503 0.667  17 20 11 22 25 19 
Italy 0.183 0.433 0.784 1.000 0.519 0.577  21 21 19 1 23 24 
New 
Zealand 0.190 0.408 0.782 0.842 0.540 0.646  19 22 20 27 21 21 
Spain 0.127 0.385 0.613 0.859 0.460 0.598  24 23 25 24 29 23 
Slovenia 0.136 0.371 0.542 0.752 0.558 0.658  23 24 26 29 17 20 
Estonia 0.070 0.343 0.404 0.933 0.385 0.490  32 25 29 20 33 26 
Czech Rep. 0.078 0.300 0.297 0.737 0.584 0.543  28 26 35 32 16 25 
Hungary 0.075 0.291 0.332 0.859 0.502 0.452  31 27 34 24 26 29 
Greece 0.094 0.279 0.683 0.849 0.306 0.438  25 28 23 26 39 30 
Slovack 
Rep. 0.077 0.260 0.336 0.750 0.509 0.462  29 29 33 31 24 28 
Lithuania 0.053 0.258 0.390 0.866 0.302 0.397  35 30 30 23 40 33 
Portugal 0.078 0.256 0.491 0.728 0.353 0.469  27 31 27 34 35 27 
Poland 0.054 0.223 0.255 0.735 0.471 0.405  34 32 36 33 28 32 
Argentina 0.076 0.200 0.349 0.627 0.484 0.425  30 33 31 36 27 31 
Turkey 0.034 0.188 0.339 0.751 0.223 0.334  37 34 32 30 42 40 
Bulgaria 0.061 0.187 0.437 0.828 0.310 0.301  33 35 28 28 38 41 
Russian Fed. 0.085 0.182 0.705 0.619 0.268 0.392  26 36 22 37 41 35 
Romania 0.034 0.164 0.225 0.641 0.336 0.341  38 37 37 35 36 39 
Mexico 0.026 0.135 0.153 0.454 0.378 0.396  40 38 39 40 34 34 
Brazil 0.028 0.130 0.147 0.465 0.423 0.373  39 39 40 39 32 37 
South Africa 0.037 0.130 0.194 0.610 0.424 0.284  36 40 38 38 31 42 
China 0.009 0.078 0.063 0.268 0.317 0.388  41 41 41 41 37 36 
India 0.007 0.039 0.036 0.143 0.432 0.364   42 42 42 42 30 38 
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1
 A very comprehensive reviews and contribution about the methodology of the composite indicators can be found on 
the ISPRA website http://composite-indicators.jrc.ec.europa.eu/. 
 
2
 We also tested the inclusion of other two variables, “labour force with tertiary education” and “S&T enrolment in 
tertiary programmes”. We decided to rule them out on the ground of a very high correlation with the other three 
variables of the pillar and due to some data missing. However, given the results we obtained we can think as if they 
were included in the second pillar. 
 
3
 Initially we also included broadband subscribers, but also in this cases we decided to rule it out because of a large 
overlapping with other variables within the same pillar. 
 
4
 For a discussion about the complementarity and the use of a consistent methodology see Cerulli & Filippetti, 2010. 
 
5
 The graph has been divided in order to highlight countries with a Compositional index larger and lower than one. 
Concerning the DEA index we preferred to divide countries according to their performance with respect to the average, 
given that nearly all of them present a DEA index larger than one, while in this way we are able to point out those 
showing a better performance. 
